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ABSTRACT
Thepaperreviews iracroeoz)nanicevents and policiesin Argentina
inthe period 1981-1984. In that periodinflation,that had decelerated
to less than 100 percent, resumed and reached irore than 600percent in
mid-1984. The real exchange rate that had appreciated in thepolicy of
disinflation depreciated sharply and, in the end-phase, realwages grew
rrore than forty percent. These events, by Northern-Atlantic standards,
are dramatic and the paper attanpts to sort out the main issues and
connections. Special attention is paid to the role of the realexchange
rate and its relation to real wages, the determinants of the black market
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"To write about recent events
is a most risky affair."
Guido di Tella
In March 1981 the Viola government took over an economy that had
already for five years been in the process of' stabilisation. Finance
minister Martinez de Hoz had attempted stabilization in 1976—78 with non—
market approaches. But he dd not succeed n that way and therefore
moved in December 1978 to an alternative that turned out to be quite
destructive ——the Plan of December 20th. The plan fought inflation by
prefixed exchange rates, using the influence of stabilized and declining
import price inflation to reduce inflationary expectations andtoreduce
directly the rate of' inflation. Concurrent commercial liberalisation was
expected to reinforce the price discipline of the exchange rate scheme.
At the same time the economy was opened widely to international capital
flows •
Theexperiment failed to stop inflation definitively and by the time
Martinez de Hoz administration left office in March 1981, a legacy of
financial instability had built up that proved unmanageable for the
subsequent administrations. Today, three years and five finance
ministers later, stability is a prospect far removed and the traditional
conflicts about real wages; distribution, and inflation remain topical
and are further complicated by an external debt crisis.
In late 1983 production of manufactures and real GDP were still at
'See Fernandez (1983), Fernandez and Rodriguez (1982) and Dagnino Pastore
(1983).2
the levels they had in early 1978 and significantly below the peak in the
transient period of prosperitiy of early 1979. Inflation has moved from
less than 100% at the peak of real appreciation in 1981 to more than
400%.Theproduct wage (manufacturing wages deflated by the WPIfor
domestic non—agricultural goods) today is as high as it was in early 1981
while the purchasing power of wages in terms of the CPI has risen more
than 30% over that period. These real wage gains, of course, stand now
at the center of domestic controversy over the budget; inflation
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competitiveness.As a counterpart industrial employment is more than 20%
below the 1979 level. The real exchange rate is significantly above the
level of early 1979 when the "tablita" started.
After more than ten years of crisis it does not make sense to try
and decide where to lay the blame for the destruction of social and
economic stability, which event to single out as crucial and which policy
to identify as "the" single step toward disaster. Some policy episodes
might claim exemption because they purported to create stability via
rules and consistency, for example the Martinez de Hoz experiment.
Others, such as the Dagnino Pastore —Cavalloadministration might appear
especially chaotic. But the former surely gained on inflation by
shifting the costs of overvaluation and increased external debts to later
administrations, while the other left behind much more inflation, but
also had reduced private and public debt burdens through a policy of
negative real interest rates.
Of course, any administration with strong political support and
favorable initial conditions must be judged by a more demanding test.3
Others that inherit lack of credibility, domestic and foreign debts,
too high real wages, overvaluation and inflation start with a handicap.
There are important differences in the strength of political mandate
with which different administrations could approach the economic
stabilization effort. Strongest, no doubt, was the mandate of Martinez
de Hoz who entered office in 1976, in the aftermath of the Peronist
debacle, on the shoulders of an as yet uncomprornised military-. His
political power, if anything, strengthened during his office as a direct
consequence of growth, reduced inflation and increased real wages. The
subsequent Sigaut administration operated with much more of a handicap,
in part self-imposed because of a lack of policy direction. Aleniann did
have strong political support but the Malvinas war completely ruined
his possibilities for stabilization. The following administrations were
rendered largely impotent by the complete collapse of any legitimacy the
military might have had. But something very positive must be said of
the post—Malvinas economic policy makers. Both gnino Pastore and Wehbe
made it their chief objective to create and sustain economic conditions
that would make possible the transition to democracy. In this they were
indeed successful even if it meant more inflation.
Whatever the weight we give to these considerations, none of the
administrations can be judged a macroeconomic success. But, in a larger
historical perspective the experience of the last three years was not
unusual as Yeager (1981,p.139) suggests:
"Argentine experience since World War II illustrates the self—
feeding aspects of an entrenched inflation—interactions among prices,
wages, exchange depreciation, controls, government deficits, and
expansion of money and credit. It provides examples of gimmickry...
Especially in contrast with episodes of successful stabilization policy
in other countries, Argentine experience illustrates the importance of4
whether the political situation warrants confidence in consistent and
resolute policy."
The 1981—84 period discussed in this paper is not the first instance
of extreme macroeconomic instability. Certainly the years 1975—76 were
much the same. But from a longer perspective the macroeconomic
performance of the post—war period is very mediocre (see Table 1) and
sets Argentina apart from other semi—industrial countries. Indeed,
Argentina's problem is very much that "semi-industrial" status, the
country is neither efficiently industrial in the way of Brazil or the
Asian NICs, nor does she exploit effectively the extraordinary
opportunities of agriculture in the way Australia has more effectively
done. The strength of the agricultural export base has meant that
Argentina was "independently wealthy" being able to squander resources on
an inefficient industry, an even more inefficient public sector and an
uriforgiveably inefficient military. There is no indication that all this
inefficiency was the direct price of advancing social objectives as
opposed to narrow and often conflicting group interests. Martinez de Hoz
has claimed his policies were designed to change in a broad way the
Argentinian economy and society, and indeed his early micro—policies
pointed in that direction. But early success made him greedy and led to
his failure. Today Alfonsin is making a second attempt, based on
democratic compromise, with as much ambition but also with the handicap
of macroeconomic priorities and problems that make success quite
doubtful.5
Table 1Historical Perspective on Growth and Inflation
(AverageAnnual Percentage Change)
1950—591960—69 1970—79 1980—83
Real GD? Growth 3.1 3.8 2.7 —2.1
Inflation 27.0 22.5 135 178
Source: IFS and BCRA.
We now present a brief overview of the 1978—84 period and then
discuss some brief details of the macroeconomic experience in each of the
four administrations. We then consider in more detail three issues:
exchange rate policy, real wages and the external debt.
I. An Overview
Table 2 shows a broad view- of the path the economy has taken over
the period. The Table brings out why the Martinez de Hoz experiment had
so much appeal: in 1979—80 there was reduced inflation, strong growth and
a gain in real wages——everybody was benefitting from the experiment. As
Calvo (1982) has argued, this transitory euphoria represents the shortrun
adjustment to overvaluation. It is the counterpart for the appreciation
case of the recessionary impact of currency depreciation which Diaz-
Alejandro (1963) had identified earlier.
The broad pattern of the 1981—84 period that does emerge is one of
accelerating inflation and declining and stagnant economic activity.
Striking points are the up and downofthe real wage and the vast
deterioration in the budget, even when the deficit is calculated net of
domestic and foreign debt service.
The budget deficit data are calculated in the following manner: the
C—P estimates due to Cavallo and Pena calculate the deficit on the basis6
















1978 174 —2.8 6.93.8 10.1 1.8 87
1979 159 6.7 7.23.8 9.02.4 98
1980 101 0.9 8.64.8 11.37.2 111
1981 104 —6.3 14.37.8 10.68.2 101
1982 165 —4.8 12.83.7 17.25.3 83
1983* 334 1.7 11.26.0 21.58.0 111
1984:1 446 139
..J.UL
Source:Fiel, BCRA, DRI Inc., Cavallo and Pena (1983).
of total public sector financing. The estimate (A) represents total
borrowing, estimate (B) excludes all debt service, domestic and
international. The estimates labelled IMPusethe International Monetary
Fund's procedures for calculating the consolidated public sector's
deficit, including state enterprises. Estimate A represents the total
financing requirement while estimate (B) excludes the inflation component
of interest payments. On the inflation—adjusted basis both sets of
estimates show a large increase in the deficit in 1980—81 and again
following the 1982 consolidation, in 1983. The budget deficit, of
course, is central to Argentinian macroeconomic instability.
In Figures 1—3 we show the behavior the real exchange rate,
industrial output, real wages and the premium in the parallel market.
The Figures highlight some of the important trends.
Figure1 showsthe real wage (average salaries in manufacturing
deflated by the cpi) as well as the real exchange rate. The real.- N V — N Vt - -l N V - NV) t
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exchange rate is measured by the ratio of the WPI of imports to the WPI
of non—agricultural domestic goods. This Figure brings out the striking
real appreciation through 1981 and the corresponding gain in real wages.
In the 1981—82:111 period real wages decline and the real exchange rate
depreciates. Finally from 1982:111 on real wages and the real exchange
rate show less of a correlation. The real wage rises in a sustained,
steep manner while the real exchange shows some real appreciation. One
of the interesting questions to be raised below is why real wages and the
real exchange rate do not move (even) closer together, ifl particular In
the 1982—85 period.
In Figure 2 we show manufacturing gross domestic product (MGDP) and
the real wage. The sharp decline In output, following the 1978—79 peak,
corresponds to the period of falling real wages and the upturn goes with
the recovery of the real wage.
Finally Figure 3summarizesthe economic history of the period in
terms of the premium of the parallel rate for dollars over the official
rate. The premium Is some measure not only of overvaluation but also of
domestic political, economic and especially financial instability. In
particular it represents it varies inversely with the anticipated return
on Argentine assets. In that perspective the premium tells an obvious
story. With the exceptions of the Martinez de Hoz period and a brief
spell under Aleinann the premium is significant and often very high
indeed. The Figure highlights the financial panic of July—August 1982
and the pre—election uncertainty in the fall of 1983. But it is clear
that by May 1984 things are again well on the way to acute instability.
The behavior of the premiuminthe period surrounding the October 30th








































































































































































































































































































































20th the premium was about 100% and on October 27tth it was still nearly
eighty percent. By October 31st it had declined to about 40% and by
December to Only 10%. But,it is clear.
We now consider first in some more detail the chief intervals of the
1981—1984 period. In later sections we deal with exchange rate policy
and with the policy options involving real wages, activity and the
external balance. As already noted in Figure 3 the April 1981 to April
1984 period saw five minsters of finance. A natural divion of the period
is offered by the tenure of these ministers.
The Martinez de Hoz Legacy: Anydiscussionof the 1981—84 period must
first come to grips with the initial conditions. Specifically one must
decide whether Martinez de Hoz had in the 1978—80 period accumulated a
significant overvaluation of the exchange rate, and with it financial
instability and capital flight, as the counterpart of a reduction in
inflation. That view is, indeed taken her.
The basic facts are well established: Having failed to reduce
inflation in 1976—77 to very low levels Martinez de Hoz embarked on a
radical experiment in the form of the "tablita". Exchange depreciation
was preannounced and set at levels significantly below the prevailing
rate of inflation. It was expected that the reduced depreciation would
directly cut down inflation but also contribute by supporting an
expectation of disinflation. Inflation did indeed come down to levels
much below 100%, but the disinflation was only borrowed by overvaluation,
not earnt by a thorough going domestic disinflation.
The claim that Martinez de Hoz presided over a significant
overvaluation of the exchange rate is at first sight entirely
uncontroversial. Surely inspection of Figure 1 shows a vast real9
appreciation of the exchange rate index between 1977 and 1980. But that
evidence, though plausible, has been challenged in three ways. The
first, entirely unreasonable, questions the very fact of real
appreciation by suggesting difficulties with price indices. That
argument cannot be taken very seriously since on any sensible measure of
real exchange rates there has been a large real appreciation.
The second challenge is based on the evolution of real activity.
It is argued that the absence of significant increases in unemployment
in 1979—80 proves that the real appreciation was not a move in a
disequilibrium direction. This argument was very fashionable in 1979—80,
but clearly with hindsight it has little merit. The data show a decline
in unemployment in 1979 from 1978, but in 1980, especially in the second
half, unemployment sharply increased. The evidence on work hours in
industry and on industrial output stronly reinforces the evidence. But
even if activity had not shown the adverse effects of overvaluation two
further considerations are relevant. First, Martinez de Hoz did bring
about a very large fiscal expansion in 1980 which must have partially
disguised the employment impact of appreciation. Second, the Diaz—
Alejandro effect-—the shortterm expansionary impact of appreciation——
would support employment via the spending effect of higher real wages for
a while before the elasticities take their toll.
The third argument is due to Rodriguez and Sjaastad (See Fernandez
and Rodriguez (1983, Appendix 2)) who argue that the overvaluation claim
may have some justification, but that any overvaluation, at the time of
their writing in 1979, was minor. The basis of their argument is a
systematic relation between the relative price of domestic non-
agricultural and agricultural goods, PD/PA, and the relative price of10
imports in termsofagricultural goods, PM/PA. Specifically they show
thatover a long sample period a decline in the real price of imports in
termsofagricultural goods systemtically leads to a rise in the real
priceof domestic goods or real appreciation. They interpret deviations
from that historical relationship as real exchange rate disequilibria. In
1979 their measure showed a 10 percent overvaluation.
Using their procedure we show in Figure 4 the time series of the
deviation from the systematic relation they claim. Clearly by 1980 the
real exchange rate, on this measure is more than 20 percent overvalued.
But the uncomfortable fact is that in the spirit of this analysis the
1976—77 period was one of massive undervaluation. This is not a view
that iswidelyheld and it throws doubt on the oversimplified
specification of the Rodriguez—Sjaastad formulation.
Perhapsan approach based on simplecommonsense is justified. Any
foreign visitor to Argentina in 1980 would have been baffled by the
extraordinary price of services——a multiple of NY prices——and the
extraordinarypurchasing power of Argentinian incomes in termsof foreign
goods.There was no plausible erxplanation that would have justified
these real incomes in terms of productivity or other basic determinants.
The simple answer was that the high real incomes corresponded to a
massive exchange overvaluation. The overvalued rate represented a
consumption subsidy for imports and Argentinians travelling abroad and a
subsidy for anyone shifting their wealth from Argentinian assets into
assets abroad.
By 1980 the public did start perceiving that the Martinez de Hoz
program was running into difficulties. A massive deterioration of the
current account, failures of financial institutions in early 1980 andFigure 4RODDRIGUEZ-SJAASTAD MEASURE OF OVERVALUATION
(!ercent overva].uation)
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the prospect of a change in government in early 1981 led increasingly to
capital flight. High real interest rates no longer proved enough to
finance the current account and budget deficits. Reserves instead of
rising started plummetting as the Central Bank maintained the tablita and
sold foreign exchange to finance the capital flight.
Table 3 shows data for the trade balance, the current account
balance and the increase in gross external debt. It is interesting to
see the large shift in the current account toward a deficit and the
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highinterest rates and confidence draw in capital flows, but in 1980 the
direction is one of capital flight. In 1980, for example the combination
of reduced foreign exchange reserves and increased gross debt sums to
$TJS 10.9 billion, but the current account deficit is only half that
amount. The remainder represents capital flight financed by selling off
reserves and borrowing abroad.
Table 3 The Balance of Payments and External Debt
(Billion Dollars)
1978 1979 1980 1981:1
Trade Balance 2.9 1.8 —1.4 —.3
Current Account 1.9 —0.5 —4.8 —2.1
Change in Reserves 2.3 4.4 —2.7 —3.0
Increasein Gross 2.0 6.5 8.2 NA
External Debt
Source:Morgan Guaranty for debt and Indicadores de Coyuntura.
The capital flight financed by the Martinez de Hoz administration
represents an unusual transfer within society. The benefits of exchange
overvaluation accrue to those who avail themselves of the subsidized12
foreign exchange: tourists and asset holders who shift part of their
wealth into dollars, foreign securities or real estate abroad. Nobody
questions that this occurred on a vast scale. But who pays? In the end
the government has sold foreign exchange at privileged prices and
incurred or assumed a foreign debt that has financed the transfer. But
then subsequently depression of economic activity or real depreciation
(i.e. reduced real wages) are required to generate the foreign exchange
with which to service the external debts. In the end the disequilibrium
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incomepart of the population toward those that had the wealth and
advantage to shift assets abroad. This aspect, of course, makes the
foreign debt question so controversial.
The legacy of Martinez de Hoz, in my judgment, was a very large
liability: He had created through the "liberalisation" policy a financial
betting parlor. High real interest rates and overvaluatiuon had started
to impair economic activity and the sharp deterioration of the external
balance and the increase in debt made the external balance a serious
constraint. In late 1979 or early 1980 might have been the time to
change policies in a sharp way toward external competitiveness and away
from excessively free and speculative markets and capital mobility.
Incomes policy and regulation would have been appropriate instead of
"rules" that were plainly not working. Of course, there is always the
argument that in another one, two, or three years everything would have
worked perfectly. But that common claim does not carry much conviction
in this instance.
1. Sigaut 1981 :4 —1981:11. The Martinez de Hoz administration had
allowed real interest rates to rise to significantly positive levels and,13
at the same time, had brought about a gain in realwages and a large real
appreciation of the currency. The rise in real interest rates throughout
1980 was required to check the capital flight induced by an increasingly
conspicuous overvaluation, but of course had not been sufficient to avoid
a massive outflow. Production in industry had declined nearly ten
percent from the 79:11 peak and GDP, likewise had declined, though by
less. The peso was widely considered overvalued and reserves had been
declining sharply. With an annual inflation rate of about 80% the
depreciation of the exchange rate, between December 1980 and June 1981,
alone amounted to 118%. The depreciation, necessitated by capital
flight, of course led to an immediate acceleration of inflation.
The Sigaut administration inherited only problems. Inflation had
been artifically lowered by the exchange rate policy, but this had been
achieved at the cost of building up an external lack of competitiveness
as well as a large external debt. Sigaut therefore had to restore
competitiveness and could not avoid some increase in inflation. The
measure of success is whether the required real depreciation could be
achieved without bringing about a precipitous rise in inflation and
matching wage gains that would erode the real depreciation. The evidence
from Figure 2 is clear: more than 20% real depreciation and a cut in real
wages were, indeed, achieved. But, of course, inflation performance
deteriorated and, after June, high real interest rates and the realwage
compression provoked a sharp cut in manufacturing output.
The real depreciation did not stop capital flight and failed tocope
with the large current account deficit. In June a dual exchange rate
regime was introduced which stayed in effect to the end of the Sigaut14
period. The discrepancy between the commercial and the financial rate
widened over time from 30 to 60 percent, reflecting a growing imbalance
between the attempt to avoid the inflationary impact of depreciation and
the need to check capital flight by a rapid depreciation of the financial
rate.
In exchange rate matters the Sigaut administration introduced two
practices that are important to note. One was exchange rate guarantees
as an incentive for renewing and lengthening external liabilities of the
private sector. The other was a preferential financial rate available
for firms willing to lengthen their external debt. In an economy with
extensive dollar liabilities of private firms the question of how private
debt is dealt with, and what incentives are offered to maintain private
external debt, are now common problems of borrowing countries that have
had to resort to devaluation. The initial overvaluation made these
questions particularly difficult in the Argentine context.
Even though some real depreciation was achieved it is clear that the
trade—off between inflation and real depreciation was acutely present.
This is apparent from the pattern of the real exchange rate in the third
and fourth quarter.In the last quarter of 1981 some 10 real
appreciation was allowed to dampen the tendency for inflation to
accelerate in a very pronounced way. The inability of the Viola—Sigaut
administration to solve the internal and external balance problems in a
manner consistent with non—accelerating inflation led to their
replacement in December 1981 by the Galtieri government with Roberto
Alemann as the new minister of the economy.
2. Alemann 1981:12—1982:6. Alemann came into office with full powers15
and particularly strong and unambiguous terms of reference:
disinflation, denationalisation and deregulation. These terms were
pursued by unifying and liberalizing the exchange market, by reducing
credit creation and by controls on wages and public sector prices.(See
Dagnino Pastore (1983) p.10).
The first quarter of Alemann showed a sharp turnaround relative to
Martinez de Hoz and relative to Sigaut as seen in Table 3. Even taking
into asccount the depreciation of the commercial exchange rate required
to unify the exchange market there was no large increase in inflation.
Of course, it must be noted that the inflation success was in part
achieved by very low depreciation in January followed by zero
depreciation in February. Output recovered somewhat and real wage cuts
and real depreciation were maintained and reinforced.
Table 4Key Macro Variables 1981-82
1981:1 1981:IV 1982:1
Inflation (year over year) 82.3 122.7 147.5
MGDP 107.0 89.0 92.6
RealExchange Rate 78.8 96.6 106.3
RealWage 111.5 99.6 96.6
Note:Index numbershavebase1980-82=100
The outbreak of the Malvinas conflict brings to an abrupt end this
stabilisation effort. Controls, not surprisingly, stabilize the economy
during the hostilities. Inflation under the influence of controls falls
to only 80 percent. But there is a lasting change that influences
significantly the external conditions under which the economy operates.
While previously capital had been readily available the hostilities, and16
later the Mexican moratorium and Brazil's inability to service her debt,
eliminate the possibility of external borrowing to finance interest and
non—interest deficits. Payments arrears and renewed issue of Bonex ——
dollardenominated lOUs of the Argentine government made their
appearance.
3.DagninoPastore: 1982:7—1982:8. The Malvinas conflict severely
weakened the miltary and Bignone who takes over at the end of the
conflict has a particularly weak mandate since the navy and airforce had
abstained from participating in the junta. On taking office Bignone
committed his government to a process leading toward elections.
The new minister of the economy assumed office with a commitment to
achieve stabilisation thus facilitating the task for the future
democratic government. His main concerns were reactivation subject to
the external constraints and the need to contain inflation. A particular
concern of his administration and the large domestic debt overhang that
was gradually drawing enterprises into bankruptcy by the sheer force of a
rate of interest that far exceeds the profitability of capital. With
bankruptcy, of course, go job losses and declining output.
Dagnino Pastore, and Domingo Cavallo at the Central Bank, shaped an
agressive program of debt reduction. Here is how Dagnino Pastore
(1983,p.13.-14) described the intentions:
"...the strategy adopted in mid—1982 was more eclectic and
unorthodox. It set as a high priority the alleviation of domestic
recession and aversion of widespread bankruptcy.It chose the path of
price controls and effective domestic debt relief, and accepted larger
wage increases than would have been countenanced under more orthodox
approaches"17
Simplifying somewhat, the strategy amounted to reducing the burden
of indebtedness of firmsbya longterm restructuring of the debts of
firmsinmanufacturing and services and legal ceilings were set for
nominal active and passive rates at levels significantly below the rate
of inflation. The effects of negative real rates are reinforced by- an
exchange depreciation. Figure 5 shows the real, free and the regulated
loan rates. The effective loan rate was a weighted average with the
regulated rate having an initial share of .9 and declining to only .3 by
mid—1983. The negative effective real loan rate therefore continued to
transfer wealth from creditors to debtors. It is clear that in the
months of July and August 1982 debt burdens were sharply reduced. But
this was achieved at the cost of a massive increase in inflation. The
inflation increase was provoked both by overly high wage settlements but
also by the portfolio shifts into real assets and the parallel market.
The scare in financial markets drove the parallel market to a peak for
the 1978—84 period.
The impact of these policies on real interest rates and inflation
was entirely drastic. Inflation rose from only 150% in June to more than
500% in July and stayed at that level for three months. The real
interest rate in the 3rd quarter of 1982 showed monthly- average of
averages —10% in the free market, —11.4 in the regulated market, and —
12.2on deposits. The negative real interest rates of course
redistributed massively from debtors to creditors. The fear of hyper—
inflation arose acutely and the policies put the economic team critically
at odds with financial interests.FIGURE 5




















0- 0- ,-4 1 1
i --i ii
3D 3D 3D 0) CO










—f ,—i — Clt
Cl C
CUCO 0) iii 0)
0- 3- cr00'-
-4 -.4 ,-l ,-4 -..4
U'T -n r— 3D 0--
r r:I t':,
3D .3) 0) CD 0) 03
0' 0' 0' 0' 0' 0--
—1 i -4
—4 —4 —.4 '—4 C..l
3)CD 33CC! w33
0' 0' 0- 0- 0- 0—
,-4.4 -.4 -418
It may be of interest to ask why inflation and negative real
interest rates, rather than other forms of debt adjustment were chosen.
Keynes in the Tract (1923,p.54—55) comments on why levies on wealth (or
currency reform) and repudiation are politically inferior choices to
depreciation and erosion of debts.
"...The remaining, the scientific, expedient, the capital levyhas
never been tried on a large scaie;and perhaps never will. It is the
rational deliberate method. But it is difficult to explain, and it
provokes violent prejudice by coming into conflict with the deep
instincts by which the love of money protects itself."
The idea of a Serman style currency reform with debt adjustment, for
example, had been rejected by Dagnino Pastore already months before (in
reply to questions on the occasion of a talk in the u.s.) as a measure
that requires more legitimacy and political support than Argentine
governments of the time could muster. The remaining alternative Df
administerednegative real interest rates did much the same in respect to
debts, but of course did so with more chaos. But then reactivation and
debt relief were the chief objectives, not inflation stabiLisation.
inflation and the external balance appeared primarily as the
constraints.
4. Wehbe 1982:8 —1983:12. Dagnino Pastore resigned on the issue of
union claims for excessive wage increases and was succeeded by Jorge
Wehbe who held office until the Alfonsin administration took over at the
end of 1983. Wehbe's policy was to seek a consolidation of the economy
with the help of an IM? stand—by agreement. Inflation was tobereduced
and contained and the external balance strengthened.
Wehbe did not dismantle the changes in financial institutions or in
exchange rate arrangements undertaken by the previous team. Loan markets19
remained regulated, although the very large negative real rates were
allowed to rise somewhat. Even so the real deposit rate showed a monthly
average of about —3percentover the next year and the real regulated
loan rate was also negative. The unregulated rates, however, became
positive.
In the exchange market the separation of a commercial and financial
market, with exchange control, was maintained through October. Only at
that time, and following a devaluation, were exchange markets unified.
But exchange control remained and the premiuminthe parallel market, as
seen from Figure 4, remained significant.
By early 1983 it might have been thought that the Wehbe policies had
managed to return inflation to levels significantly belDw the third
quarter Df 1982, restore some measure of fiscal discipline and do so with
rising real wages, growing output and without a deterioraticn in externaL
competitiveness. But clearly by late 1983 none was Left of that. Month
to month inflation, annualized, in the third quarter had accelerated to
600 percent, and the gain in external competitiveness was eroding. But
output and real wages retained their gain. In the fourth quarter
inflation remained at that higher level, and real wages had increased
further. The problems for the Alfonsin government were set with firm
roots.20
Table 5TheWehbe Performance
RealwageMGDP Real Exchange Inflation
(Index1980—82= 100) (annualized)
1982:IV 99.6 95.0 143.4 272.7
1983:111 114.0 102.1 121.5 601.7
1983:IV 124.0 99.3 126.1 629.6
5. Grinspun 1983:12— .Generalagitation and the possibility of a
Peronist victory in the election had driven the parallel market to its
second highest level in the recent past. The victory of the decidedly
moderate Alfonsin government led to a rapid stabilisation of the premium,
at least for a while. But the new government was saddled with three
immense problems: record high inflation, an unexpectedly high real wages
and an unwise promise of much more to come, and finally an external debt
that demanded attention if not service.
Debt issues were postponed for six month, to June 1984, and
attention focussed on the domestic front, delaying initially serious
economic issues in order to build a political foundation. But large wage
settlements kept up and threatened to accelerate inflation even beyond
the 600 percent level. Arrears on the external debt service, highlighted
at Punta del Este, forced a return to the IMF as part of the
international debt rescheduling process. The dilemma of the day is how
to cut real wages, especially in the public sector and thus have a chance
to reduce the budget deficit. But cuts in real wages would certainly
weaken the governments ability to get an upper hand in controlling and
weakening the power of unions. Matters are made easier by the fact that21
the external balance, not counting debt service, presents no difficulty
at all. In all likelihood the deciding factor is not the external debt
but the threat of explosive inflation that calls for immediate and
drastic attention.
II. Exchange Rate Policy
The history of the period, starting with Martinez de Hoz, is
particularly interesting because of exchange rate policy. The Martinez
de Hoz experiment —stoppinginflation through underdepreciation —gave
rise to the need to undo the overvaluation. But, of course, in the
process inflation accelerated. Increased inflation, in turn, called for
more rapid depreciation. The spiral was broken, off and on, by a slowing
down of the rate of depreciation and, inevitably and soon, by a catch—up
depreciation forced by the difficulties of the external balance.
Figure 6 shows this pattern. The bars represent the depreciation
rate of the commercial rate, end of month relative to the end of the
preceding month. The smoother line shows the change in Argentine
relative to US wholesale prices. We take this relative WPI inflation
trend, a three month centered moving average, torepresent very broadly
the depreciation rate that would preserve purchasing power parity. It is
clear that in the period 1981—82 there are alternations of
underdepreciation followed by maxidevaluations, starting with the
Martinez de Hoz devaluation in February 1981.
Is there any regularity to this exchange depreciation pattern? A
hypothesis would run as follows: The exchange rate, other things ecjual,
is depreciated at the PPP rate, indicated by the smooth line, so as to
maintain external competitiveness. But there are two adjustments. First22
an incoming finance minister will use the occasion to make an immediate
corrective devaluation the size of which will depend on the overvaluatjon
she encounters as well as on the parallel market premium. Second, a
niaxi—devaluation will always be somewhat forward looking and, for that
reason, allows a slowdown in depreciation at least in the immediately
following month.
InTable6 we show a test of this hypothesis. We use a dummy that
assumesavalue of unity in the first month of a new minister's term.
The explanatory variables are the dummy times the level of overvaluation,
DTJMOVER, and the dummy times the premium in the parallel market,DUMPREM.
The variable PPP measures the depreciation rate indicated by the last
months' change in relative wholesale prices. DTJMPOST is a dummy that
assumes a value of unity in the month following a maxi. The equation was
estimated by OLS with monthly data for the 1981 to 1984:2 period.
Explaining Exchange Depreciation
DUNOVER DUMPREM DUMPOST H
The empirical evidence offers support for the hypothesis. The PPP
coefficient is not significantly different from unity, although the point
estimate is only .74. There are strong first—month—of—office effects and
these devaluations are, indeed, governed byanestimate of overvaluation
(overvaluation is measured by the log of the real exchange rate relative
to its average over the 1981—84:2 period). Likewise a premium in the
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Finally the month after a maxi there tends to be strong reduction in
depreciation relative to the PPP trend.
Figure 7 shows the residuals (actual less predicted) of the
exchange rate equation. The few episodes of large residuals are of
interest. First, in April 1981 the first Sigaut devaluation is smaller
than predicted for a first month of office devaluation. Next the June
devaluation is an outlier because it does not coincide with anew term.
In 1982:2 a large outlier shows and is easily identified from Figure 6.
This outlier corresponds to Alemann's zero devaluation. Finally we note
in 1982:8 an underprediction because Webbe does not make the traditional
first month devaluation. But there is a matching positive error in
1982:11 when he does devalue. Note finally that Grinspun's first month
does not show up as an outlier because neither vervaluation nor the
premium in the parallel market were particularly out of line.
Even though the equation does leave sone significant outliers it goes
far toward offering a common sense explanation of the apparently wild
depreciation behavior. It is interesting to note that neither reserve
losses nor inflation, or inflation acceleration, appear to be significant
determinants of the rate of depreciation.
III.RealWages and the ReaL Exchange Rate
One of the impressive facts of the 1981—84 period is the large
variation in real wages. Figure 8 shows once more the real wage in
manufacturing. The Figure brings out the gradual real wage gains in
1977—80, following the large initial cut. Then, already under Martinez
de Hoz but particularly under Sigaut and Alemann real wages decline
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show a gain of fully 70 percent to their 1984:1 levels. And, of course,
the rise may still be continuing, given Alfonsin's commitments.
An interesting puzzle raised by the real wage behavior is the
following: We know that in the 1982-84:1 period the real exchange rate —
WPIofimports relative to the WPI of domestic, non—agricultural goods—
did not deteriorate significantly if at all. Yet during that period real
wages increased by 70 percent in terms of the CPI and the product wage in
terms of non—agricultural,domestic goods rose 58 percent. Where is the
leeway for real wages to rise that much without generating a
deterioration in competitiveness?
A likely explanation goes as follows. We define in equation (i )the
real wage as the money wage deflated as the CPI. The latter is a
weighted average of non—agricultural domestic prices (PD),import prices
(PM), agricultural prices (PA) and prices of goods supplied by the public




Equation (3)showsthe price of domestic goods as the unit labor
requirement, a, multiplied by the money wage (w)andthe financial cost
where r is the effective real cost of capital. Combining equations (1)
to (3)weobtain an equation for the real wage:1
(4) w =w(PA/PM,PM/PD,Ps/PD,(1+r))
Equation (4) shows that the real wage declines if agricultural prices
rise relative to import prices. A real depreciation, a rise in PM/PD,
likewise leads to a decline in real wages as does a rise in the real
price of public sector goods. A rise in labor productivity, 1/a, or a25
fall in the real financial cost raises real wages. The model thus
identifies three key relative prices, as well as real financial costs as
determinants of the real wage. Equation (4) could be further developed
by expressing PA/PM in terms of the external terms of trade, import
tariffs and export taxes. Similarly PS/PD might be expressed in terms of
the average subsidy rate of public sector goods. In these terms a rise
in the public sector subsidy would raise real wages, higher export
tariffs on agricultural goods or lower import tariffs, likewise, would
lead to increased real wages.
It is clear that the real wage expression in (4) has room for
variables other than the real exchange rate PM/PD. Moreover, these other
variables have moved significantly during the period and hence may help
explain why the real exchange rate and real wages show only a correlation
coefficient of —.50 for the 1981—84:1 period. At the same time these
changes can explain why the CPI fell by nearly 35percentrelative to the
WPI since early 1981.
The discussion of real wages already shows that income distribution
between workers and producers of agricultural goods is tied up in the
question. Compensated real depreciation for example, raises the real
prices of imports in terms of agricultural goods while improving the
budget through increased tax revenue and lowering real wages. By
contrast, removal of import tariffs raises real wages and might worsen
the budget while raising real prices to agriculture. Gaining real wage
growth consistent with no deterioration of the real exchange rate clearly
means either a deterioration in the world real price of agricultural
goods or else a commercial policy that redistributes income away from26
agriculture. Such a policy- can, of course, worsen significantly the
external balance.
The variables that influence the link between real wages and the
real exchange rate have,indeed, changed significantly over the period.
Table 7 shows the behavior of the average rates of export taxes, the real
prices of public sector goods, the terms of trade and the real interest
rate. The large movements in these variables make it clear that we should
nopt expect anty simple relation between real wages and the real exchange
rate. But it also means that a simple Rodriguez-Sjaastad real exchange






Real Interest Rate (%)**—4.6 12.7 25.3 2.4
*Export Duties as a fraction of exports. **Free active rate
1983,controlled and free rate respectively.
Source: Indicadores de Coyuntura and Carta Economica
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There is another relation that we do not explore here in detail
but that is worth noting. There appears to be strong empirical linkage
between the real wage——wages deflated by the CPI——and manufacturing
employment. The relation suggests that increased real wages have quite
plausibly an expansionary impact on spending and production even within
the current quarter. Interestingly the expected negative link between the
product wage and employment does not appear in a striking way in the
Table 7 Determinants of the
1979
Real Wage-Real Exchange Rate Linkage
1980 1981 1982 1983
0.7 2.2 4.6 12.6
100 110 89 97
—22/44
and, for27
data. The linkbetweenreal wages and output is of course a critical
issue for stabilization policy: attempts to control real wages in order
to bring the budget under control have immediate adverse effects on
output and employment.
IV. External Debt
The external debt situation is highly confusing because data are
almost as sketchy as debt service. Three available sources offer the
information shown in Table 9. The data come from Morgan Guaranty, the
Banco Central de la Republica Argentina and the Bank for International
Settlements.
Table 9 Argentina Gross Total External Debt
(Billion $IJS, December 1983)
Total DebtDebt To BanksDebt/port
Ratio
Morgan Guaranty 38.5 27.0 4.8
BCRA 43.4 NA 5.4
BIS NA 23.4 NA
We take as given that the debt, including arrears, is around $ 40
billion, 75 percent of which is owed to banks. The rest involves
supplier credits and claims of official agencies. Official reserves at
the end of 1983 amounted to $ 2.8 billion and arrears stood at $2.3
billion. Another important aspect of the debt is that it has a very
short maturity. The BIS estimates that in mid—1983 more than half the
bankdebtof Argentina had a maturity of less than one year and 60% a28
maturity of less than two years. There is accordingly not only a problem
of debt service but also of amortisation.
The debt service problem is simple and obvious. In 1983 net
financial services in the balance of payments showed a deficit of $ US
5.4 billion. This stood against a non—interest surplus of of $ US 2.9
billion. The non—interest surplus thus pays about half the debt service.
The problem is how to cope with the other half. Of course, Argentina is
not alone in this position, most Latin American countries are unable to
service their debts entirely out of current earnings and, following the
drying up of automatic capitalisation through fresh money, have been
muddling through. Argentina is special in that she has allowed arrears
to develop in an agressive fashion, even to the point of testing the NY
banks ability to take losses in their quarterly statements. Her ability
to do so sterns in part from a large trade surplus and some reserves, in
part from an indecisiveness of the lenders who cannot quite decide how to
think about so much independence.
The confusion of the debt issue is increased by the fact that
Argentinian residents conspicuously own assets abroad. Indeed that same
banks that seek repayment of debts from the Argentinian government are
the depositaries of Argentina's private capital flight. The data are
incomplete but even so they tell an obvious story: In December 1983 banks
in the major lending countries had claims of $23.4 billion on Argentina.
With only partial reporting liabilities of these banks to Argentina
amounted to $6 billion. These liabilities do not include the securities
or real estate in which Argentinians have invested on a large scale. A
significant part of the gross external debt is thus matched by private29
Argentinian assetsabroad.The debt crisis, in that perspective is an
inability of the Argentinian government to control those foreign assets.
Assuming that policy makers in Argentina do pursue a deliberate
strategy of building up arrears to develop a negotiating position, what
can Argentina hope to achieve? A mild course is to bargain for longer
terms, smaller spreads, and fewer strings. None of this is outrageous
arid, given the complete impossibility of actually retiring, as opposed to
only servicing the debt, this is a likely course of events. Interest
capitalisation that now is actively discussed appears a plausible step in
this direction.
An aitetmative, much more confrontational option is to call for a
complete renegotiation of the debt on concessional terms. The banking
community and policy makers in the U.S. are not prepared, it would
appear, to entertain such a possibility. European bankers, however, have
advocated a low level interest cap at say 7 percent. With such a cap
interest charges in excess of the cap are automatically capitalized.
This is, of course, what has been effectively been happening with
countries such as Mexico or Brazil where part of the interest has been
paid and part has been borrowed. An explicit cap would render that
process merely automatic thus replacing the periodic rescheduling. With
a cap the debt servicing is lightened and the question whether the debt
will ultimately be repaid is conveniently postponed toinfinity.
V.WhereNow?
Argentina is in the process of negotiating a new stand—by agreement
with the IMF. If the events at Punta del Este are an indication she
appears to have turned away from radical debt options. Raul Prebisch,30
who is advising the President, and who in Argentinians domestic policy
has always been conservative, has publicly called for wage discipline. A
proposal is being considered for delaying ex—post adjustments of wages to
a quarterly basis, thus cutting the real wage. But there is another
strand that wants to hold the Alfonsin government to a commitment to
increase further real wages. What direction will have the upper hand and
will exteriial considerations be the deciding factor?
The external debt situation, as Mr.Grinspun rightly remarked, is more
a bankers' problem than a problem for Argentina. Argentina is running a
trade surplus and has reserves. She can easily sell much of her exports
in world markets and does not have a critical import dependence that
would make it easy to enforce debtor discipline. The external situation
by itself will therefore not be the deciding factor unless banks unwisely
make it such, or unless an explicit political decision is made to use the
debt issue to gain a broader domestic support for recovery and
stabilisation —the"fortress Argentina" model.
The inflation problem, and with it the real wage—budget deficit link
aremuch more likely to force a change of direction. The real wage gains
of the past half year will lead to a dramatic deterioration of the budget
since about 75 of non—interest outlays are for wage payments. Increased
real wages then mean increased deficits and an increased financing
requirement. Since external financing has stopped there is then a need
to finance the budget domestically and that means largely inflationary
money creation and still higher inflation. So far the non—interest
current account is in a comfortable surplus so that, not counting the
growing arrears, increased deficits that spill—over into external





In concluding it may be worth looking ahead to compare Alfonsin's
with that encountered by Martinez de Hoz in 1976. Table 8 shows
relevant to that comparison.
More precisely, the question is what level of inflation is
to give Alfonsin a mandate for a 180 degrees turn toward
But firm orthodoxy is there a willingness for restraint and a
to use incomes policy rather than monetarism to control
Table 8 Comparing the Beginning of Two StabiLisation Efforts
Inflation Budget Output Debt/Export
(%ofGDP) (%ofPeak) Ratio
1976 443 12.9 98.7 2.1
1983 446 21.5 91.3 5.0
Today, more than seven years since the time stabilisation started,
the chances for success certainly look as poor as they can be. Inflation
and the budget are as bad as they were in 1983. But output is much lower
which argues against austerity and the external debt is a liability
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. W/CPI W/PD PM/PD PA/PDGDPMGDP INFMINFQ
1978:1 84 72 126 109 94 100 218 171
1978:2
> 84 74 114 110 98 106 180 189
1978:3 89 79 103 113 100 109 124 179
1978:4 89 80 93 120 100 113 188 167
1979:1 90 84 83 111 102 117 201 169
1979:2 95 87 83 110 106 122 151 157
1979:3 99 89 79 120 106 117 173 169
1979:4 108 101 79 109 107 117 73 149
1980:1 109 111 81 104 103 114 105 123
1980:2 106 112 78 106 104 114 99 113
1980: 3 111 120 77 107 108 116 64 91
1980:4 116 132 76 93 110111 90 89
1981:1 112 133 79 84 103107 81 82
1981:2 101 112 93 €35 104 99 160 89
1981:3 92 94 102 94 94 89 167 113
1981:4 99 98 97 101 94 89 134 12:3
1982:1 89 84 106 97 95 93 149 147
1982:2 80 70 124 102 94 85 85 130
1982:J. 86 6:3 143 116 94 92 497 156
1982:4 100 73 144 112 CE 94 27% 203
198: 1 97 69 139 108 96 85 362 245
1933: 2 108 80 137 106 97 98 296 :314
1983:3 114 84 121 121 97102 602 339
1983 4 124 91 126 112 95 98 830 404
1984:1 139 105 1.33 114 N 554 446
Note: Definitions: W—salario nominal, CPI—consumer price index
PD—domestic,non—agricultural wholesale price
PA-agricultural wholesale price
PM-wholesale price index of imported goods
GDP -realgross domestic product
MGDP- real gross manufacturing product
INFM- month-to-month inflation ,annualized
INFQ— inflation,quarter over same quater of previous year
W/CPI is the real wage,W/PD the product wage and PM/PD the real
exchange rate. The indices in the first six columns all have a
base 1980—82=100.







































































Prem- premium (%)ofthe parallel dollar rate
over the official rate
RFRate—real free loan rate,% per month
RRate -real regulated loan rate
RDRate-real deposit rate
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'Suppose the CPI has a Cobb—Douglas form so that in logs it can be
written as follows: LogCPI= blogPD+clogPA +dlogPM+flogPSwhere b1—c—
d—f.IJsing that restriction we can with some manipulation derive an
expression for the real wage: log(W/CPI)=_c.Log(PA/PM)_(c+d)log(pM/pD)_
dlog(PS/PD) +v,herevLog(a(14-r)) denoting the combined effect of
productivity and financial costs .Nowlet e=Log(PM/PD) denote the real
exchange rate. Furthermore assume public sector prices are proportional
to domestic prices: PS =KPD where K denotes one less the rate of implicit
subsidy and k=logK for notational convenience. Suppose,too, that there
is an export duty on agricultural goods so that the domestic price is
linked to the world price by the relation PA*=TPA where tlogT denotes
the logofone plustherate of export duty. Finally denote the
international termsoftrade p*=log(PA*/P*).
Substituting the shortcut notation in the real wage equation we
have:log(/CFI)= ct _cp*_(c*d)e_ dk—v. The equation showsthat increased
export taxes or increased public sector subsides raise real wages. By
controasta terms of trade improvement lowers real wages as does a real
depreciation. Increased financial costs orreduced productivity,
tikewise,reducethe real wage.33
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